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''The Rock of Accomplishment" 
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Ortona 
Shaun R.G. Brown 
T he struggle for Ortona is one of the best known battles fought by Canadians in the 
Second World War. MatthewHalton, theCBC's 
chief radio correspondent in Italy, made "Mora 
River" and "Ortona" household words in 1943 
and since then veterans as well as war 
correspondents and historians have offered 
numerous accounts of that December in 
Abruzzi. 1 
This article focuses on the role of the Loyal 
Edmonton Regiment in clearing the town of 
Ortona, but it is important to remind ourselves 
of the context within which the battle was 
fought. The Allies had invaded the Italian 
mainland to force Italy out of the war, to 
establish air bases for the strategic bombers, 
and to draw off the maximum number of 
German troops. Hitler's decision to stand 
south of Rome was all that sensible Allied 
planners could have hoped for. The Foggia 
plains were suitable for air bases and the 
Germans poured resources into Italy to meet 
the Allied advance and into the Balkans to 
replace the Italian Army. 
Hitler gave Field Marshal Albert Kesselring 
specific orders to fight "a delaying action only 
as far as the line Gaeta-Ortona. This line will 
be held," the Fuhrer insisted. Eisenhower, 
though still in command of overall Allied 
operations in Italy, saw the theatre increasingly 
in terms of its significance for Operation 
Overlord. On October 25th he informed the 
British Prime Minister that: 
Left: Personnel of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment 
during streetf1.9hting in San Leonardo di Ortona, Italy, 
1 0 December 1943. 
(Photo by F.G. Whitcombe/NAC PA 114487) 
My principal commanders and I are in complete 
agreement that it is essential for us to retain the 
initiative until the time approaches for mounting 
Overlord, otherwise the enemy will himself seize the 
initiative and may force us on the defensive 
prematurely, thus enabling him to withdraw divisions 
from our front in time to oppose Overlord. If we can 
keep him on his heels until early spring, then the 
more divisions he uses in a counter-offensive against 
us the better it will be for Overlord and it then makes 
little difference what happens to us if Overlord is a 
success. 2 
This clear and realistic appraisal of the 
purposes of the Italian campaign did not appeal 
to Churchill. The Prime Minister was still 
fearful of Overlord and anxious for a major 
victory in Italy which would allow him to argue 
against the withdrawal of troops and landing 
craft for the invasion of the south of France. 
General Harold Alexander was left with the 
task of devising a plan which would meet 
Eisenhower's objectives even if it failed to fully 
realize Churchill's dreams. He developed a 
three-phased scheme which required 
Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery's 
Eighth Army to advance north across the Sangro 
River to capture Pescara and gain control ofthe 
important Rome-Pescara highway. Eighth 
Army was then to turn west, attacking Rome 
from the flank while Lieutenant-General Mark 
Clark's Fifth Army attacked towards Rome 
through the Liri valley. Finally, a seaborne 
landing atAnzio, south of Rome, would secure 
the Alban hills outflanking the Germans from 
the west. 3 If all went well the Allies would be in 
Rome for Christmas or early January, but even 
if the terrain, the weather and the enemy 
denied capture of the Italian capital, the real 
purposes of the campaign would still be fulfilled. 
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Old woman on road strewn with destroyed Gennan tanks and guns, 13 December 1943. 
Eighth Army began its attack on the 28th 
November and in less than two days British, 
Indian and New Zealand troops had cracked 
through the Bemhardt line shattering the 76th 
Panzer Corps and forcing Kesselring to send 
the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 
Fourth Parachute Regiment to re-establish the 
Adriatic front north of the Mora River. 
Montgomery concluded that a further push to 
Pescara was impossible without a pause to 
build up supplies and work on the bridges 
across the Sangro which were threatened by 
heavy rains. He also decided to rest 78th 
Division and replace it with l st Canadian 
Division. 
The New Zealand Division led off the 
renewed offensive, but its objective, Orsogna, 
could not be captured easily. 4 The Canadians 
were ordered into action early to relieve some 
of the pressure on the New Zealanders and on 
the night of 5th/6th December, lst and 2nd 
Brigades attacked across the Mora. The initial 
battles for Villa Rozatti (The Princess Patricia's 
12 
(Photo by F.G. Whitcombe/NAC PA 136196) 
Light Infantry [PPCLI]) and San Leonardo 
(Seaforth Highlanders) led the enemy to commit 
the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to a 
series of sharp counterattacks. On the right 
flank, the Hastings and Prince Edward 
Regiment's bridgehead, which was supposed 
to be a diversion, allowed the divisional 
commander, Major-General Chris Vokes, to 
renew the attack on San Leonardo with a "right 
hook" carried out by the Royal Canadian 
Regiment. This too was unsuccessful, but San 
Leonardo was finally taken by a battle group 
from the Calgary Tanks and Seaforth 
Highlanders. 5 
The German defence of the Mora had to this 
point been a skilled and successful delaying 
operation. But the enemy now decided to wipe 
out the Canadian bridgehead which controlled 
the coastal highway. The attack by the 90th 
Panzer Grenadiers' reserve battalions 
demonstrated the difficulties faced by the 
attacking force in Italy. The Hastings and 
Prince Edward Regiment were "behind well-
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prepared defence zones which had been 
carefully registered for artillery and mortar fire 
and covered by machine-guns set up to fire on 
fixed lines. "6 The German attack, preceded by 
an artillery and mortar barrage, was cut to 
pieces by observed mortar fire and disciplined 
small arms and machine gun fire. The loss of 
close to 200 men forced the German Corps 
Commander to order a withdrawal to the edge 
of Ortona behind a deep ravine the Canadians 
would call the "Gully." [A full description of the 
battle for the Gully is contained in the shaded 
boxes on pages 14-15.] 
The collapse of the German position at 
the Gully ought to have led to a general 
withdrawal to a ridge line north of the Tesoro 
and Arielli rivers. This is certainly what 
Montgomery anticipated, but for reasons that 
remain unclear, General Herr, commanding 
76 Panzer Corps, decided to defend Ortona 
with two parachute battalions. There has been 
much ink spilled over the battle for Ortona and 
it has been suggested that the Canadians 
should have simply by-passed the town. 7 In 
fact no such choice existed. If the Canadians 
had limited their advance to 1st Brigade sector 
the attack up the Ricco valley would have been 
opposed by the full weight of 1st Parachute 
Division. Ortona and the coastal highway were 
essential objectives if the advance north was to 
be continued and sustained logistically. 
****** 
Ortona is an ancient city founded by the Trojans after the fall ofTroy. The northern 
part, called the "Old Town," consists of 
13 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/2
The Battle for the Gully 
(from the British Official History of the Mediterranean Campaign) 
"From Ortona the road to Orsogna 
ran along a low ridge for rather more 
than three miles. Below this ridge on 
the south side there was a narrow deep 
ravine. Some farm-buildings were dot-
ted along the ridge, notablyCasa Berardi 
which we can take as near the ridge's 
western end. Highway 16 crossed the 
ravine and ridge at their mid-point and 
led to Cider Cross-Roads. Ravine and 
ridge formed the Gully, which the Ger-
mans were determined to defend. There 
was no obvious way of outflanking it 
because the sodden ground discouraged 
cross-country manoeuvres, while only a 
bad track led from S. Leonardo to a point 
about a mile west ofCasa Berardi. The 
Canadian Division spent from 11th to 
19th December in forcing this position 
at a cost of over 1,000 casualties. The 
defence was conducted by Colonel 
Heilmann of 3rd Parachute Regiment 
with his own 2nd and 3rd battalions, 
2nd Battalion 1st Parachute Regiment, 
the battered 200th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment, a battalion of 36lst Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, 90th Engineer 
Battalion, and detachments of tanks 
from 190th Panzer Abteilung and 26th 
Panzer Regiment. These troops were 
not all simultaneously engaged. The 
battle was fought in fair and foul 
weather, on boggy ground, in a tangle of 
olive trees and vineyards sprinkled with 
mines and booby-traps. From the 11th 
to 19th December 5th Corps' artillery 
fired about 3,000 tons of ammunition. 
The details of dogged attacks by the 
Canadians and of the German's resolute 
defence and fierce counter-attacks are 
too many for the scale of this narrative. 
What follows is descriptive analysis. 
On the morning of lOth December 
the Edmontons and a squadron of the 
Calgary Regiment reached the gully so 
quickly that at 10 a.m. Colonel Jefferson 
(commanding officer of the Edmon tons) 
signalled "We are now proceeding on 
final objective." Slashing mortar and 
machine gun fire soon blew away this 
hope. Vokes seems early to have ac-
cepted the front of little more than two 
thousand yards which lay before him, 
and to have resolved to go straight for 
his objective. His reasons were the sod-
den ground which would hinder cross-
country movement; a feeling that the 
objective was very close and would fall 
to a quick punch and therefore a wish 
not to spend time in fully concentrating 
his division. Moreover the Canadians 
had a predilection for small attacks, 
powerfully supported, on narrow fronts, 
markedly shown in the fighting from 
Assoro to Regalbuto in Sicily. 
The Canadian Division made eight 
main attacks on the Gully. Of these, if 
we set aside overlappings and diver-
sions, five were by single battalions, two 
by two battalions, and the final attack 
was by three battalions following each 
other in three closely successive phases. 
Armour, not in great strength, took part 
in all attacks. All the attacks except the 
last failed because momentum was lost 
owing to the same general causes. The 
enemy's fire, much of it cross-fire, was 
very heavy and his counter-attacks were 
frequent, determined, and well-timed. 
The Canadian infantry often "lost" their 
artillery support because of the ordi-
nary mischances of battle and because 
the artillery was fighting at a disadvan-
tage. This was because the succession of 
attacks was so 
(Continued on next page) 
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(continued from previous page) 
quick that often two or three fire plans 
were being prepared at once, largely 
from not altogether accurate maps. The 
resulting fire programs were oftenfaulty, 
and frequent calls for heavy Defensive 
Fire to meet counter-attacks sent them 
further astray. 
The key phase of the battle occurred 
probably on the 13th and 14th Decem-
ber. On the 13th, one of the rare occa-
sions on which the fighter-bombers could 
operate in strength, a frontal attack 
towards Cider Cross-Roads by the 
Carleton and York Regiment, and at-
tacks on its right and left by PPCLI and 
the West Novas failed. But meanwhile 
two small fighting reconnaissances pro-
duced unexpected results. On the left 
flank a bad track led from S. Leonardo to 
the Ortona road a mile west of Casa 
Berardi. Two small parties-"B" Squad-
ron of the Ontarios and a platoon of 
West Novas, and four tanks of the On-
tario's "C" Squadron with "A" Company 
of the Seaforth Highlanders - inde-
pep_dentlyfol!owed this track, foup.d "soft 
spots" on theGerman right flank, slaugh-
tered some\surprised detachments, and 
almost reached Cas a Berardi. The press 
of the main battle made it impossible at 
once to exploitthe opportunity, but Vokes 
tl).tnedhiseyetothis route. On the 14th 
December he launched the Royal 22e 
Regiment along it with "C" Squadron of 
the Ontario Regiment, while .the PPCLI 
attacked frontally. The Germans were 
now guardingtheirrightflank, ):mt there 
followed a splendid feat of Canadian 
arms. Captain Paul Triquet with his "C" 
Company of the Royal 22e and the On-
tario's tanks captured Casa Berardi by 
sheer, relentless fighting and a furious 
determination to win. In Casa Berardi, 
Triquet, who had ouly fifteen men and 
four tanks, gave the time-honoured or-
der "Ils ne passeront pas." Nor did the 
Germans pass, for by 3 a.m. on the 15th 
Colonel Bernatchez had collected a larger 
force and had consolidated. Captain 
Triquet was later awarded the Victoria 
Cross. 
Vokes now sent another squadron of 
tanks to Casa Berardi and ordered an-
other frontal attack by the Carleton and 
York, believing that this and the flank-
ing threat from Casa Berardi would 
make the defence collapse. The attack 
failed. But the events of the 13th and 
14th had seriously worried Heilmann 
and Baade; their immediate reserves 
were all committed; and they now blessed 
the two-day respite which followed the 
failure of the Canadian attack on the 
15th. On the 18th Vokes launched a 
carefully staged attack from west ofCasa 
Berardi in three phases with the sup-
port offighter·bombers. This attack by 
the 48th Highlanders, the Royal Cana-
dian Regiment, the Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment, and the Three Riv-
ers Regiment, was admirably executed, 
and succeeded, not without very sharp 
fighting. By dusk on the 19th the Gully 
and Cider Cross-Roads passed into 
Canadian hands."B 
extremely narrow streets with most buildings 
connected by common walls. The town is 
dominated by two massive towers, a 15th 
century fortress perched on the promontory 
above the harbour, and the cathedral of St. 
Thomas about two hundred metres inland. In 
1943 the coastal highway entered the built-up 
area about eight hundred metres from the 
centre of the city. 
operating with just three rifle companies of 60 
men each. Reinforcing drafts were on their 
way forward but did not reach Ortona until the 
24th of December. In the words of the 
regimental historian, "It is perhaps fortunate 
that most of them did not arrive until the battle 
was virtually over, Ortona was no place for new 
hands or for men who did not know each 
other."9 
There are three open squares in Ortona: 
Piazza della Vittorio in the southern, newer 
portion of the town, Piazza Municipale at the 
junction of the old and new towns, and Piazza 
San Tomasso in the old town, a few metres 
from the castle. There was no possibility of an 
advance along the sea front and a deep ravine 
precluded attack from the west. 
The Loyal Edmon tons entered the operation 
well below strength and by the third day were 
Left: Infantry of the Edmonton Regiment and tanks of 
the Three Rivers Regiment, Ortona, 23 Dec 1943. 
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 114030) 
Major A. J. Rudd, then a sergeant and 
Platoon Commander in "A" Company of the 
Loyal Edmon tons, described his entry into the 
town: 
The battalion advanced into Ortona with two 
companies up, A and B, on the left and right of the 
main street. Covered by Bren gunners, the lead 
sections closed up to the door, the section commander 
would toss in a "36" or "69" hand grenade and then 
the section would rush in to clear the bottom floor. 
We tried to gain the upstairs as soon as possible. 10 
The Jerry defences were very good, and obviously 
well-planned. Machine guns were always mutually 
supporting and they even had tanks hull down in 
bombed-out houses. Defended buildings were 
15 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/2
Right: Lance Corporal E. A. Harris. 
Loyal Edmonton Regiment in Ortona, 
21 December 1943. 
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 114490) 
Below: A patrol from the Loyal Eddies in 
Ortona. 
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163932) 
barricaded with sandbags and all kinds 
of household goods. The windows were 
screened with chicken wire to keep out 
grenades. They set up some first class 
booby traps. You might see a nice 
Bible or piece of stain glass lying about 
a house. Items like these were usually 
connected to at least a pound of 
explosive. This certainly discouraged 
looting." 
The first day's fighting had 
brought the Edmontons and "C" 
Squadron of the Three Rivers 
Regiment to the Piazza Vittoria at 
the southern edge of the old town. 
Here they discovered that the 
German engineers had blocked the 
side streets with rubble from 
demolished houses. The "paras" 
hoped to entice the Canadians to advance 
down the Corso Vittorio Emanuele to the Piazza 
Municipale which would become a killing 
ground. Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Jefferson 
had other ideas. He insisted that the companies 
take their time planning platoon -size operations 
against one or two houses. Where possible a 
tank would be used to blast down walls at short 
range. More often the Edmonton's six-pounder 
anti-tank guns were brought into play. A 
platoon commander explains their role: 
We used the anti-tanks in an unique way. The shells 
could not penetrate the granite walls, sometimes 4ft. 
thick. So we just put them through the windows and 
they bounced around inside much like they would in 
an enemy tank doing horrible damage. 12 
It was a battle of great innovation and adaption. 
All the hardware of the infantryman was brought 
to bear against his entrenched foe. 
We preferred to clear houses from the upstairs down. 
If we couldn't get through the windows, we 
"mouseholed." The "Beehive" charges we used would 
kill any Germans in the adjacent rooms and we 
followed right through immediately. The "36" 
grenades could be dropped downstairs before we 
7
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A Shennan of the Ontario Regiment firing at Gennan positions in a nearby house. 
carried on to clear the lower rooms. This was a basic 
difference between our approach and the Jerry tactics. 
When they came into a house it was on the ground 
floor. Trying to return the favour of our grenades was 
disastrous for them. Their old "potato mashers·· 
would rattle back down the stairs to explode at their 
feet. 13 
The individual rifleman took on two 
additional burdens in Ortona, primarily 
because of the uniqueness of the struggle. The 
first was grenades. In addition to the one 
hundred rounds of rifle ammunition, each 
man carried ten or twelve high explosive and 
two or three "75" anti-tank grenades. The 
other item that came into vogue was the steel 
helmet, according to Rudd: "Before arriving in 
Ortona, none of our chaps wore them. Then 
everyone was clamouring for a tin hat. A lot of 
lives were saved by tin hats when the bricks 
started to tumble." 14 
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163933) 
By now the name Ortona had captured 
world headlines. Matthew Halton, Ralph Allen, 
as well as the British war correspondent, 
Christopher Buckley, never hesitated to follow 
their stories right into the firing line. One of 
Buckley's stories read: 
What a strange clutter of humanity it was. There 
were some five or six Canadian soldiers, there were 
old women, and there were children innumerable. A 
painter of genius - Goya, perhaps - might have 
done justice to the scene .... In the half-darkened 
room the pasta for the mid-day meal was simmering 
over the fire in the corner. Haggard, prematurely-
aged women kept emerging shyly, one after the other 
from some inner chamber where an old man, the 
grandfather of the children, was dying .... Another 
old man was uttering maledictions against Mussolini. 
Then his wife surprisingly produced a jeroboam of 
Marsala and a half-dozen glasses. She moved around 
the soldiers filling and re-filling their glasses. The 
children clambered over the Canadian soldiers and 
17 
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clutched them convulsively every time one of our 
anti-tank guns, located only a half dozen paces from 
the door of the house, fired down the street in the 
direction of one of the German machine gun nests. 
Soon each of us had a squirming. terrified child in 
our arms. The old lady went on serving Marsala. 15 
Jefferson had been allotted "D" Company 
of the Seaforths on the 22nd and the next day 
the remainder of the battalion arrived to clear 
the left flank while the Edmon tons concentrated 
on the area between the main street and the 
harbour. 
A Gennan soldier captured in Ortona. 
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 107934) 
18 
On December 24th, resistance stiffened. 
Major-General Vokes asked Brigadier 
Hoffmeister if further operations should be 
cancelled or delayed, but Hoffmeister was 
confident. The German paratroopers were, he 
told Vokes, taking a dreadful beating and 
Brigade morale would suffer if they were not 
allowed to finish the job. 16 
The Loyal Edmonton War Diary noted more 
paratroops had been thrown into battle. In 
addition, the Germans brought in flame 
throwers to which the Edmon tons answered by 
calling in fire from 17 -pounders on the coastal 
road. On approaching the Piazza Municipale, 
"D" company under the command ofMajorJ.R. 
Stone, was halted by intense fire for the entrance 
to the square was covered by no less than five 
machine guns. Private C.G. Rattray was 
dispatched with two comrades and crawling 
through the rubble, disdaining snipers and 
grenade throwers, managed to gain entry to 
the upper floors of the building housing the 
M.G.s. Rattray captured five paratroopers, 
three machine guns, four rifles and three pistols. 
Stone meanwhile stalked an adjacent M.G. 
post, destroyed its crew with grenades and 
silenced a heavy anti-tank gun. Ortona had 
become an intensely personal battle with one 
man pitted against the wits and daring of 
another. 17 
Late on December 24th, a draft of seventy-
five reinforcements arrived mostly from the 
Cape Breton Highlanders. There has been 
much controversy over the quality of 
reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Division 
and for that matter the entire Canadian Army 
effort from 1939-45. In the interviews 
conducted with Major A.J. Rudd, Colonel J.R. 
Stone, and Major-General G.G. Brown, all 
participants in the Italian campaign, there is 
unequivocal agreement that the quality of 
reinforcements, at least in December 1943, 
was excellent; however, their numbers were 
almost always disappointing. General Brown 
remembers the Cape Bretoners as 
"tremendously good soldiers, we considered 
them brothers-in-arms and perhaps it was a 
kinship borne out of the knowledge of a mutual 
suffering in the depression; it is hard to say, 
but they were fine soldiers in every respect. "18 
9
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The Cape Breton draft was welcomed by a 
seniorN.C.O. with the cheery intimation, "Just 
in time to hang up your stockings."19 But this 
was a Christmas with neither peace nor 
goodwill. The battle continued and the 
Edmontons increased their resolve. The 
Edmonton War Diary notes: "this is our fifth 
Christmas on Active Service and the fiercest 
fighting so far encountered continued 
throughout the day" Colonel J .R. Stone recalls 
the day: 
On Christmas Day 1943, I was on the main street of 
Ortona, directing a local attack ordered by my C.O. 
Three of my men were killed on the street before 0900 
hrs. My Christmas dinner was a cold pork chop 
brought forward on a "Bren" carrier. A most unhappy 
day.2o 
Major-General G.G. Brown remembers: 
I was in a battered old house which was our H.Q. a 
few blocks from the enemy. We rotated in sections 
back a few hundred yards for Christmas dinner. We 
set a table with liberated china and tablecloths and 
even nameplates for seating. Pork 
chops on our plate, canned carrot 
pudding, nuts, candy, wine; we 
tried to encrust it with some of the 
ideals from home. Whether it 
worked or not, I'm not qutte sure. 
The fighting went on, we had to 
change the barrel three times on 
one of the six-pounders. 21 
Major A. J. Rudd recalls: 
We were just down from St. 
Tommaso Square. We rotated back 
to the diner. We were out for about 
half-an-hour and then it was back 
to the fight. You must remember a 
soldier has very little appetite when 
in the middle of battle. 22 
After being wounded, Sergeant 
Johnny Marchand is being placed on 
a stretcher by soldiers andfirst-aid 
men of the Three Rivers Tank Regi-
ment. Ortona, 21 December 1943. 
(Photo byT.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163927) 
The Padre of the Seaforths noted his Christmas 
observations: 
The tables filled and emptied and filled again, and I 
saw many a tense face relax in the warmth within the 
walls of the battlescarred church. What a concert of 
noise! As relief and relaxation took hold, the talk 
became louder and greetings and jokes were shouted. 
The cookers hissed and sizzled behind the altar and 
the plates clattered as they were cleared from the 
tables and piled high on the altar itself. Desecration 
of the Lord's Table? It did not strike me so. Above the 
din one could sometimes hear machine-gun fire and 
shells. It was wonderful to hear so much laughter so 
close to so much death and suffering. I don't know 
how many remembered Christ that day but I feel that 
most of these men, whether they knew it or not, 
remembered the things Christ stood for -
compassion, faithfulness to a cause, self-sacrifice.23 
Of the fighting in Ortona on Christmas day the 
war diary of the Tenth German Army reported: 
In Orton a the enemy attacked all day long with about 
one brigade supported by 10 tanks. In very hard 
house to house fighting and at the cost of heavy 
10
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casualties to his own troops, the enemy advanced to 
the market square in the southwestern part of the 
town. The battle there is especially violent. Our own 
troops are using flame throwers, hand grenades and 
the new bazookas (ofenrohre). 24 
It is interesting to note in the above quote 
the reference to a "brigade" (i.e. at least 3 
battalions). At this point the Canadians had 
only the Edmontons and Seaforths, at 60 per 
cent strength, in Ortona. The German War 
Diaries consistently overestimated Allied 
strength, both in land forces and the weight of 
artillery and air bombardments. The reasons 
for this are numerous; the most obvious one is 
that it offered a creditable excuse for failure. 
During the Ortona engagement all evidence 
suggests that both sides were relatively even in 
ground forces. Tank, artillery and air 
participation was severely restricted. 
Throughout December 26th the grim 
struggle continued with the Loyal Edmontons 
inching forward to their final objectives. The 
Piazza Tomasso, the last of the great squares, 
was in sight. On that day the enemy succeeded 
in the last ofhis deadly stratagems. Lieutenant 
E.B. Allen, with twenty-three men, occupied a 
building which the enemy had· mined before 
abandoning. A heavy charge brought it down. 
The Pioneers who rushed forward to dig them 
out were harassed by grenades. Corporal G.E. 
O'Neil counterattacked and single-handedly 
drove out the grenade throwers. Sergeant 
Sandy McLaren recalled the incident: 
20 
By this time the men were all very tired as they had 
very little sleep. I got my men into a large house right 
across the street from the enemy so we had to be on 
guard all the time. That night I was called to 
company headquarters where I met Lieutenant E.B. 
Allan and Company Sergeant-Major L. Paquette. I 
was told that I was being promoted to company 
Sergeant-Major ofB Company and Allan and Paquette 
were taking over my platoon. I explained the situation 
to Lieutenant Allan and told him the men were dead 
tired. I also told him the guard would have to be kept 
awake because there were tunnels from house to 
house. They then went to the house and I stayed at 
headquarters. At 0500 the next morning we heard a 
blast and went to the house where my men were 
stationed. The house had been levelled and my men 
buried in the rubble. 25 
The aftermath of battle - Refugees retum to their 
homes in Ortona, 30 December 1943. 
(Photo byT.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163938) 
On December 28th, the Edmonton War 
Diary matter-of-factly reports the end of the 
battle: 
At 0945 hrs. this morning our patrols reported that 
the area of the "Ortona Fort" had been cleared of the 
enemy. Shortly thereafter, our eight-day battle for 
the city came to an end when it was declared clear of 
the Hun. 26 
The Regiment returned immediately to 
excavating the demolished buildingwhereAllan 
had disappeared with his platoon, but no 
additional survivors were found. Matthew 
Halton tells of accompanying Lieutenant Frank 
Whiting ofVictoria, on the final patrol to secure 
Ortona: 
We went with him, high strung as cats, through 
mines and dead men and appalling ruin. We heard 
laughter and turned and saw some Canadian soldiers 
talking in a basement to some Italian girls, laughter 
and girls there in Ortona ... I saw a Canadian lying 
in a marksman's position on a pile of rubble. It was 
five seconds before I realized he was dead. He was 
still aiming a rifle, a locket of hair hung freely down 
his neck. It was moving back and forth in the brisk 
cold wind. The Germans were superb - admit it 
freely- and when that is said, our Canadians were 
better. The Boche had all the cards - the prepared 
positions, the hundreds of booby traps and mines; 
we had to seek him out and kill him man by man. And 
so, on these fearful notes the Battle of the Moro River 
ends .... 27 
The cost had been heavy. Loyal Edmonton 
Regiment casualties for the eight days 
numbered 172 with 63 dead. The Seaforth 
Highlanders lost 41 killed and 62 wounded. 
German casualties were 455 including 168 
killed. 28 
The advance from the Moro River had cost 
the 1st Division 176 officers and 2,163 other 
ranks killed and wounded. Sickness, including 
battle exhaustion, had reduced divisional 
strength by a further 1,617. The 8th Indian 
Division with 3,400 casualties and the New 
Zealand Division with 1,200 were in a similar 
state. 29 Every infantry battalion had suffered 
50 per cent casualties in the rifle companies.30 
These are the cold statistics. The inevitable 
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roster of war. We must look beyond the grim 
toll to assess the Canadian infantryman's 
accomplishments at the Moro River. 
In the battle for Ortona, every bullet did not 
hit its mark. The ammunition expenditure of 
the Loyal Edmontons for eight days attests to 
this fact and points out, in a rather detached 
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There are often more subtle indicators of the 
characteristics of a battle and they are just as 
telling in their own right. The Edmonton's War 
Diary of December 28th notes: 
As a rule the foe either removes his dead or buries 
them on the spot. Ortona has been the exception, for 
approximately 100 dead have been left dying due to 
his hasty withdrawal. 32 
In reviewing the statistics of 
neuropsychiatric (battle exhaustion) casualties 
for the 1st Canadian Division's infantry brigades 
for the period 28 November to 12 February 
1944, it becomes evident that of all infantry 
battalions the Loyal Edmontons enjoyed the 
smallest ratio of these types of casualties. Low 
ratios were maintained by the 2nd Brigade 
throughout the Italian campaign.33 There are, 
of course, many factors which ultimately came 
to bear upon this figure. An Army psychiatrist 
offered one explanation: "The emotional ties 
among the men, and between the men and 
their officers, is the single most potent factor in 
preventing breakdown. "34 The factors which 
help to make a man a soldier in the moral sense 
are, according to B.H. McNeel, his sense of 
personal value and responsibility and the time-
honoured sentiments of pride in his regiment 
and respect for his leaders. From the day he is 
inducted, the process of incorporating him as 
a person into the fighting forces must begin. 
Whatever one thinks ofthe thesis that mediocre 
men can be made effective by good leadership, 
the fact remains that the fewest behaviour 
problems arise in well-led regiments. 35 
22 
George Brown, who had leamed so much 
as a lieutenant from Major Stone in Ortona, 
outlines the essence of good leadership: 
Stone was an exceptional leader. He took his time to 
carefully survey the battlefield. He controlled his 
men in battle by his voice or by radio when possible, 
but most often by voice. He watched them, directed 
them, getting them on. He was a tremendous example 
of how a good leader with good control could inspire 
the confidence of his men.36 
After Ortona morale was initially high. An 
important component of the Canadians' attitude 
was a sense of their exclusivity, of being 
members of an unique brotherhood. As Major-
General Brown put it: 
There emerged an aura of a no-nonsense unit that 
knew what it was doing. It was hard to put your 
finger on any single phenomenon except perhaps the 
great mutual confidence that seemed to abound. 
Great respect for one another and yet good discipline 
as well, no first name slap-on-the-back relationship, 
but a healthy one between the officers, men and 
N.C.O.s. A quiet confidence built upon the rock of 
accomplishment. 37 
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